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Abstract
This paper extends Galor and Weils (2000) unied growth model on the
evolution of population, technology and output by replacing the parental utility
function in which consumption and children are unrelated, with a more gen-
eral specication in which some commodities are unrelated with children while
the others are substitutes. Considering some leisure goods as the substitutes
for children, it aims to explain the demographic transition from high to low
fertility with the observed increase in the relative price of children to that of
leisure goods along with Galor and Weils quality-quantity mechanism based on
the observed increase in the educational attainments. This modication leads
to a conclusion that the demographic transition is a natural phenomenon in
this environment when children become relatively more expensive than leisure
goods, even for a given level of education and a given price of leisure goods. In
addition, an increase in education and a decrease in the price of leisure goods
contribute to the demographic transition.
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1 Introduction
Economic history of Western European countries brings up an important challenge
for theories of development. These countries have undergone three di¤erent economic
regimes in terms of the evolution of population, output and technology during the
process of economic development. In the early stage of development, prior to 1800,
these countries were trapped in the Malthusian regime where agricultural technol-
ogy was dominant and technological progress was more or less totally absorbed by
the number of inhabitants and hence income per capita remained roughly constant.
Countries then moved into the Post-Malthusian regime where both income per capita
and population growth increased. While mortality was falling, fertility was increasing
until the second half of the nineteenth century and reached its highest level around
the 1870s. Through the demographic transition from high to low fertility, countries
nally entered the Modern Growth regime where the relationship between income per
capita and the growth rate of population becomes negative.1
It is widely accepted that the transition from the Malthusian regime to the Post-
Malthusian regime is due to the industrial revolution which took place during the
late eighteenth century and the rst half of the nineteenth century whereas the chal-
lenge has been to explore the mechanisms responsible for the demographic transition
from high to low fertility.2 Faster technological progress and an increase in the ed-
ucational attainments observed in those countries in the late nineteenth century is
understood to be the main driving force behind the demographic transition.3 The
1For relevant empirical evidence in each regime, see Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor (2005).
2There is a substantial body of literature on the relationship between long-run growth and popu-
lation dynamics. Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), Fernandez-Villaverde (2001), Jones (2001), Kögel and
Prskawets (2001), Galor and Moav (2002), Greenwood and Seshadri (2002), Hansen and Prescott
(2002), Tamura (2002) and Doepke (2004) develop models which generate a transition from the
Malthusian stagnation to modern growth, accompanied by a demographic transition from high to
low fertility.
3The other theories of the fertility decline include the following. Becker (1981) argues that fertility
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quality-quantity tradeo¤ model, pioneered by Becker (1960), is the foundation of
theoretical contributions that promote this mechanism (e.g., Galor and Weil, 2000;
Fernandez-Villaverde, 2001; Doepke, 2004). Although di¤erent authors take di¤erent
approaches,4 the main feature of the mechanism is that parents care about the quan-
tity (number) and quality (e.g., human capital) of their children and a rise in returns
to investment in human capital induces them to choose a fewer but highly educated
children.5
This paper analyzes a quality-quantity tradeo¤ model in which, however, the in-
crease in educational attainments is combined with an additional force in explaining
the demographic transition. The additional force works through the substitutabil-
ity between children and some commodities in the parental utility function. We
claim that certain types of leisure goods can be substituted for children in enhancing
parental welfare. In the literature, children (quantity augmented with quality) are
treated as a durable consumption good which produce parental satisfaction. Substan-
tial amount of such satisfaction is produced when parents engage in activities such
as playing with and talking to their children throughout their lifetime. Francis and
Ramey (2008) consider these as high enjoyment activities and classify them as leisure
decreases as the substitution e¤ect of an increase in wages dominates the income e¤ect, implying
that the opportunity cost of children increases. Becker et al. (1990) explain that fertility decreases
as the aggregate level of human capital increases. Galor and Weil (1996) explain the fertility decline
in relation to an increase in the gender wage gap which is the result of women-specic technological
progress. Boldrin and Jones (2002) take the old-age security hypothesis and explain the fertility
decline as a result of a decrease in infant mortality rate. See Galor (2005) for an extensive literature
review on the empirical relevance of the theories of the demographic transition.
4We will shortly see Galor and Weils (2000) mechanism generating the rise in returns to invest-
ment in education. In Doepke (2004), faster technological progress in industrial technology increases
the returns to education by increasing the gap between skilled and unskilled wages. Fernández-
Villaverde (2001) considers the role of capital-skill complementarity for explaining the rise in returns
to investment in education.
5However, empirical evidence on the rise in returns to education during the nineteenth century
is scarce and hence quite controversial. Clark (2003) argues that it did not increase noticeably.
In response, Galor (2005) explains that an increase in the demand for skilled labor could meet an
increase in supply, leaving the skill premium roughly constant.
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while other childcare activities are classied as non-leisure. In that sense, children can
be considered as a leisure good in the economic analysis of fertility. Under such cir-
cumstances, one could think of some commodities that may be better substitutes for
children than the others. For example, playing sports, clubbing, developing hobbies
and so forth can be substituted for the satisfactions from having children at certain
degrees. In addition, increased consumption of such activities may be responsible
for the fertility decline. Francis and Ramey (2008) nds that the average leisure per
week did not increase dramatically during the twentieth century for most of the pop-
ulation in the United States. However, the consumption of leisure goods increased.
According to Lebergott (1996), the consumption share of leisure goods increased from
3 percent in 1900 to just over 8 percent in 2001.6 Another compelling piece of evi-
dence is that leisure goods have become relatively cheaper than other consumption
goods. According to Kopecky (2005), the relative price of leisure goods to that of
consumption goods declined by 26 percent between 1900 and 1950. Our paper is
the rst contribution in the literature that claims children are a type of leisure good
and tries to attribute the increased consumption of other leisure goods (that can be
substituted for children) to the fertility decline. The idea is that when leisure goods
are expensive in the early stages of economic development, parents raise children to
gain utility from leisure activities during their lifetime. In the literature, the biggest
cost of raising children is time so that the market wage is often used as the price of
children. The observed increase in the market wage and the observed decline in the
price of leisure goods increase the relative price of children which induces parents to
substitute leisure goods for children.
The quality-quantity tradeo¤model that we choose to account for this additional
6We have not found similar evidence in the case of Western European countries. However, given
the experience of the U.S. and Western European countries over the last century in terms of economic
development, we project a similar pattern.
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force on the demographic transition, is that of Galor and Weil (2000) (henceforth,
GW). GWs model has the following features. Parents are assumed to care about
both the number of children they want and the human capital of each child alongside
a consumption set. The human capital of each child depends positively on the level
of education per child but negatively on the rate of technological progress (i.e., the
erosion e¤ect). Technological progress is endogenous and depends positively on both
the size of population and the existing level of education. Raising children requires
time and its opportunity cost is measured by the level of potential income that can
be earned in the labor market. In this environment, the optimal level of education
(quality) per child depends positively on the rate of technological progress while
the optimal number of children depends positively on parental potential income but
negatively on education per child. In the Malthusian regime, population size is small
and technological progress is slow so that parents have no incentive to educate their
children. Population growth absorbs technological progress fully hence income per
capita remains low and roughly constant. Over time, an increase in population size
raises technological progress and economies enter the Post-Malthusian regime. Faster
technological progress produces the opposite e¤ect on population growth. On the
one hand, it allows parents to spend more resources on children by raising their
income. On the other hand, it induces parents to invest in their childrens education
which tends to decrease the number of children they want. Overall, the positive e¤ect
dominates the negative e¤ect hence population growth increases, but more slowly than
the rate of technological progress, consequently, income per capita increases. When
income per capita reaches a su¢ ciently high level, the positive e¤ect of technological
progress on fertility vanishes hence its negative e¤ect through education leads to
the demographic transition. The economies enter the Modern Growth regime. As
population growth declines, income per capita increases even faster. GW obtain
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these results qualitatively while Lagerlof (2006) examines the model quantitatively
and nds that the simulation results are consistent with those in GW.
We choose GWs model for the following reason. Since Becker (1960), it has been
a common practise in the economic analysis of fertility to consider that families derive
utility from a single aggregate commodity (consumption) along with the quantity and
quality of children rather than the quantities of individual commodities. The reason
for this is that there are no good or close substitutes for children according to Becker
(1960). However, Becker admits that there may be many poor substitutes for children.
GW assume a Cobb-Douglas utility function which implies no substitutes for children
- i.e., the elasticity of substitution between children and consumption is unity. We
replace this assumption with a more general one that some goods are unrelated with
children while the others are substitutes, at certain degrees. Considering substitutes
for children is not new in the literature. Moreover, models that assume substitutes for
children generate the demographic transition from high to low fertility (e.g., Jones,
2001; Kögel and Prskawets, 2001). However, these authors emphasize the property of
the utility function without identifying potential substitutes for children so that they
do not have any empirical relevance. In particular, the whole consumption set is a
substitute for children in Jones (2001) while all manufacturing goods are substitutes
for children in Kögel and Prskawets (2001).7
We disaggregate the consumption set in GW into two broad categories: consump-
tion good, an index of commodities that are not substitutes for or unrelated with
children and leisure good, an index of leisure goods and services that are substitutes
for children. All individuals are assumed to produce both goods using di¤erent tech-
nologies. They use the same technology in GW to produce the consumption good
7Kögel and Prskawets (2001) also consider a single agricultural good which is assumed to be
unrelated to children and represents subsistence consumption.
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while use a fraction of the consumption good as an input to manufacture the leisure
good. The production of the leisure good is subject to an exogenous technologi-
cal change which captures decreases in the price of leisure goods. Except for this
modication, the structure of the present model is the same as that in GW.
In this model, the decision rule governing the optimal level education per child is
the same as that in GW and depends only on the rate of endogenous technological
change expected to occur in the sector producing the consumption good. The decision
rule for the optimal number of children, on the other hand, shows a hump-shaped
relationship with parental potential income, for a given level of education per child
and a given price of the leisure good as in Jones (2001) and Kögel and Prskawets
(2001), rather than a positive relationship in GW. The reason is that the price of the
leisure good is important when choosing child quantity as they are substitutes. The
price of children is measured by parental potential income which tends to increase
with the endogenous technological progress while the price of the leisure good is an
inverse of exogenous technological change in this sub-sector. In fact, the model can
generate the hump-shaped relationship between fertility and income per capita for
any growth mechanism as long as the relative price of children to that of the leisure
good increases over time.
We initially analyze the dynamical system of the model for a constant, yet very
high price of the leisure good. Under such circumstances, the model behaves exactly
the same as that in GW in both the Malthusian and Post-Malthusian regimes in terms
of the evolution of population, technology and output. As in GW, there is a frontier,
called the Malthusian Frontier, which separates the Modern Growth regime from
the other two. In this model, fertility starts falling as soon as the economy crosses
over the Malthusian Frontier into the Modern Growth region while it would become
constant in GW, for a given level of education. The reason is that the Malthusian
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Frontier separates one region where children are a relatively cheaper commodity than
the leisure good from the other region where the opposite is true. In that sense, the
demographic transition is a natural phenomenon in the current model. While only
further increases in education generates the demographic transition in GW, it is not
necessary in this model in spite of its contribution.
A decrease in the price of the leisure good is another mechanism that contributes
to the demographic transition as it increases the relative price of children. For a given
level of education, an increase in the relative price of children to that of the leisure
good contracts the boundary of the Malthusian region and hence the economy can
cross over the Malthusian Frontier earlier than otherwise.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the model
and solves it. Section 3 analyzes the evolution of the dynamical system of the model
and conclusions are given in Section 4.
2 The Model
We consider GWs overlapping-generations economy in which there are many identical
individuals who live for two periods. As children in the rst period of life, individuals
are economically inactive and consume a fraction of their parentstime. As adults
in the second period of life, they decide on the amount of consumption, the quantity
(number) and quality (education) of their children and the labor market participation.
A consumption set in GW is now disaggregated into two types of goods: consumption
good, an index of goods that are unrelated with children in parental utility and leisure
good, an index of leisure goods that, to some extent, are substitutes for children. All
adults work to produce the two goods using di¤erent technologies. The consumption
good is produced using land and e¢ ciency units of labor as inputs as in GW in which
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the land is exogenous and xed over time and the quantity of e¢ ciency units of labor
is endogenously determined from householdsoptimization problem in the previous
period. The production of the leisure good, on the other hand, uses a fraction of
the consumption good as an input. The demands for both goods together with the
quantity and quality of children is determined by the householdsdecisions in each
period.
2.1 Technology
Each adult produces zt unit of the consumption good for each unit of time in period
t in accordance with the following constant-returns-to-scale technology:
zt = h

t x
1 
t = h

t

AtX
Lt
1 
(1)
where ht is the amount of e¢ ciency units of labor or human capital per adult, Lt is
the size of the working age population, X is total (exogenous and constant) land, At
is the level of land augmenting technology and  2 (0; 1) is the labor income share.
The term AtX is total e¤ective resources hence xt = AtX=Lt is e¤ective resources
per adult.8
All working age individuals manufacture the leisure good by combining a frac-
tion of the consumption good and the current state of technology in this sub-sector.
Specically, we adopt a technology similar to that used by Vandenbroucke (2009) for
his leisure good production and assume the following production function so as to
simplify the analysis:
qt = Btmt; (2)
8Multiplying (1) by Lt yields the aggregate production function, Yt = Ht (AtX)
1  where Ht is
the aggregate amount of e¢ ciency units of labor - i.e., Ht = htLt.
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where qt is the units of output of the leisure good, Bt is a productivity parameter,
and mt is the fraction of the consumption good. The maximization problem is given
by:
max
mt
fptBtmt  mtg
where pt is the unit price of the leisure good relative to that of the consumption good
which is normalized to one. The optimal decision rule for this problem is pt = 1=Bt.
2.2 Preferences and Budget Constraints
Each adult member of generation t is assumed to derive utility from the amount of
the consumption good, ct, in excess of its subsistence level ~c > 0, child quantity, nt,
augmented with human capital of each child, ht+1, and the amount of the leisure
good, dt, in accordance with the following function:9
u =  log(ct   ~c) + (1  ) log [ (ht+1nt) + (1  )dt ]
1
 (3)
An important feature of the utility function in (3) is that the satisfaction from the
consumption good is logarithmically separated from those generated from both chil-
dren and the leisure good. The implication is that the consumption good is neither a
complement nor a substitute for both children and the leisure good - i.e., the elasticity
of substitution between both ct   ~c and ht+1nt and ct   ~c and dt is unity. Another,
yet the most important feature of (3) is that the leisure good and children enter the
utility function through a CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) function where
9GW consider potential income of each child, wt+1ht+1, rather than human capital per child,
ht+1, in the parental utility function. Since they consider a Cobb-Douglas utility function which
yields the same results as the log-separated function, wt+1 does not play any role as individuals
take it as given. In the current model, however, considering wt+1ht+1 would greatly complicate the
analysis. For that reason, we follow Galor (2005) and consider only ht+1 in the utility function.
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 and 1    denote their respective utility weights. The value of the parameter, ;
determines whether children and the leisure good are substitutes, complements or in-
dependent for parental utility. The elasticity of substitution is then 1=(1  ):When
0 <   1 ( < 0), they are substitutes (complements), implying that the marginal
utility of children decreases (increases) with an increase in the amount of the leisure
good. If  = 0, the expression converges to a Cobb-Douglas function, implying that
the marginal utilities of children and the leisure good are independent of each other
in the utility function after being logged. The following analysis considers the case
with 0 <   1 to be consistent with the idea that the leisure good is a better substi-
tute for children than the consumption good. Setting either  = 0 or  = 1, we can
derive a log-seperated utility function as in Galor (2005) which imply no substitutes
for children in the economy as in GW.
As in GW, the adult is endowed with one unit of time which can be allocated
between two mutually independent activities: working and raising children. Given her
endowment of e¢ ciency units of labor, ht, the adult would earn potential income equal
to zt if she spent her entire time endowment in the labor market. Raising children
requires only time as an input. Let  q be the fraction of adults time associated
with producing and raising one child regardless of quality and  e be the fraction
of the adults time connected with each level of education (quality) for each child,
et+1. Since time devoted to raising children can be exchanged for the consumption
good in the market, the opportunity cost of this activity is a fraction of her potential
income: ( qnt +  eet+1nt)zt which can also be understood as the total spending on
the purchase of children (both quality and quantity). Her actual income is then
determined by (1    qnt    eet+1nt)zt. Since the adult allocates her actual income
between purchasing the consumption and leisure goods, her budget constraint in GW
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is generalized to
ct + ptdt = (1   qnt    eet+1nt)zt (4)
where pt is the relative price of the leisure good to that of the consumption good
which is normalized to unity.
Unlike GW, we assume a constraint that governs the minimum number of children
that parents want as in Jones (2001) and Kögel and Prskawets (2001), that is
nt  n > 0: (5)
According to (5), the minimum number of children constraint binds if the optimal
number of children derived from the optimization problem is smaller than it.
Following GW, we assume that human capital of each child, ht+1, depends on
the expected rate of technological progress between periods t and t+ 1 in the sector
producing the consumption good, gt+1  (At+1 At)=At and education per child, et+1
in an implicit fashion:
ht+1  h(gt+1; et+1) (6)
where h() > 0, hg() < 0, hgg() > 0, he() > 0, hee() < 0, and heg() > 0 8
(et+1; gt+1)  0. The interpretation of these conditions is that the rate of technologi-
cal progress has a negative e¤ect on human capital and this "erosion e¤ect" declines
as gt+1 increases while education has a positive e¤ect on human capital and its e¤ect
declines as et+1 increases. The last property implies that technological progress in-
creases the return to investments in education or education reduces the adverse e¤ect
of technological progress.10
10Lagerlof (2006) considers an explicit functional form for h(gt+1; et+1), that is ht+1 =
et+1+
et+1++gt+1
where  2 (0; 1) is an exogenous part of the total xed time cost of raising chil-
dren,  , that contributes towards building human capital - i.e., children acquire some knowledge
while being raised (public good) which is, however, not as e¤ective as formal education. Therefore
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2.3 Utility Maximization
Given zt; pt and gt+1, the adults choose ct; dt; nt and et+1 to maximize their utility
in (3) subject to the budget constraint in (4) and the minimum number of children
constraint in (5). The rst order conditions with respect to dt; nt and et+1 are given
by
(1  )pt
ct   ~c =
(1  )d 1t
 (ht+1nt)
 + (1  )dt
; (7)
(1  )( q +  eet+1)zt
ct   ~c =
ht+1n
 1
t
 (ht+1nt)
 + (1  )dt
; (8)
(1  ) entzt
ct   ~c =
h 1t+1 n

t he()
 (ht+1nt)
 + (1  )dt
: (9)
In (7), the expression on the left-hand side represents the utility cost generated from
purchasing one unit of the leisure good measured by the forgone consumption good
while the utility gain is on the right-hand side. In (8), the expression on the right-
hand side shows the utility gain of having one child while its utility cost is on the
left-hand side as it decreases the amount of the consumption good by decreasing the
adults labor market participation. The price the adult pays for each child quantity is
( + eet+1)zt which is increasing in zt as well as in et+1 as the same level of education
has to apply to each child. The expression in (9) shows the utility gain of purchasing
an extra unit of education for each child on the right-hand side while the utility cost
is on the left-hand side which is measured by the forgone consumption good through
a decrease in the adults time available for generating income. The price paid for the
extra unit of education is  entzt which is an increasing function of zt as well as of nt
because an additional unit of education must apply to more units. The presence of nt
in the price of quality and that of et+1 in the price of quantity will ensure the classic
interaction between the quality and quantity of children when the other things such
et+1 +  is e¤ective education.
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as parental income change (e.g., Becker and Lewis, 1973).
We divide (8) by (9) and obtain the same expression as in GW:
G(et+1; gt+1)
8><>:  0 if et+1 = 0= 0 if et+1 > 0 (10)
where G(et+1; gt+1) = ( q+ eet+1)he(et+1; gt+1)  eh(et+1; gt+1). Assuming G(0; 0) <
0, GW derive the following decision rule for the optimal level of education per child:
et+1 = e(gt+1)
8><>: = 0 if gt+1  g^> 0 if gt+1 > g^ (11)
where g^ > 0 and e0(gt+1) > 0 for any gt+1 > g^. According to (11), the optimal
level of education per child is 0 when the rate of technological progress is su¢ ciently
slow, but positive and increases with gt+1 for su¢ ciently fast technological progress.
According to GW, a decrease in the level of human capital due to the erosion e¤ect
of technological progress is reduced by an increase in education for gt+1 > g^. The
implication is that the overall e¤ect of technological progress on human capital is
still negative - i.e., hg (e(gt+1); gt+1) < 0.11 It is also true in Lagerlof (2006) for his
choice of the functional form for h(et+1; gt+1). The optimal level of education per child
hence their human capital are, however, independent of parental potential income,
zt. The reason can be explained using (8) and (9). Other things being equal, an
increase in zt tends to increase the demand for both et+1 and nt by decreasing the
marginal utility of the consumption good, (1   )=(ct   ~c), implying that they are
normal goods - i.e., it generates the wealth e¤ect. At the same time, it produces
11This assumption simplies the following analysis greatly. In the other cases, an increase in
education would either fully recover or more than fully recover the loss in human capital - i.e.,
hg (e(gt+1); gt+1)  0. While the former would not a¤ect the qualitative results, the latter would
lead to more general results.
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a substitution e¤ect on the demand for both commodities by increasing their prices
 entzt and ( q +  eet+1)zt: directly as well as indirectly through nt for the former
and through et+1 for the latter. This interaction between the quality and quantity
of children leaves the level of education per child una¤ected to the changes in zt. In
other words, the income and substitution e¤ects are cancelled out.
After some manipulations, one may obtain the following expressions for the opti-
mal quantities of children and the leisure good:
nt = max

n;
 (1  ~c=zt)
( q +  eet+1)(1 + 
t)
 n(pt; gt+1; zt)

; (12)
dt =Mh

 1
t+1

zt(
q +  eet+1)
pt
 1
1 
nt  d(pt; gt+1; zt) (13)
where M = ((1  )=) 11  and 
t = M
h
zt(q+eet+1)
ht+1pt
i 
1 
. Let n() and d() be
shorthand notations for n(pt; gt+1; zt) and d(pt; gt+1; zt) respectively where we use
et+1 = e(gt+1) and ht+1 = h(e(gt+1); gt+1) = h(gt+1). The functional properties of
n() and d() are summarized in the following proposition.12
Proposition 1 Other things being equal
(a) A decrease in the price of the leisure good, pt, leads to a decrease in nt, but an
increase in dt - i.e.,
np() > 0 and dp() < 0.
(b) Technological progress expected to occur between time t and t + 1 in the sector
producing the consumption good, gt+1, has a negative e¤ect on nt but an ambiguous
12GW assume that the total derivative @z(ht; xt)=@gt > 0 (holding At 1 constant) although the
partial derivative is negative (holding xt and thus At constant). This assumption is maintained in
the current model.
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e¤ect on dt for all gt+1 - i.e.,
ng() < 0 and dg() Q 0.
(c) There exists a time varying critical value ~zt  ~z(pt; gt+1) so that an increase in the
parental potential income, zt, has (c.1) a positive e¤ect on both nt and dt if zt < ~zt
and (c.2) a negative e¤ect on nt but a positive e¤ect on dt if zt > ~zt - i.e.,
(c.1) nz()  0 and dz() > 0 if zt  ~zt,
(c.2) nz()  0 and dz() > 0 if zt  ~zt.
where ~zt > ~c > ~c for  2 (0; 1). In addition, ~zg() < 0 and ~zp() > 0.
Proof. The results in parts (a) and (b) follow directly from di¤erentiating nt in (12)
and dt in (13) with respect to pt and gt+1 after substituting (11) and (6) into (12)
and (13). The sign of nz() in part (c) is determined by:
sgn fnz()g  sgn f~c(1  )  
t(zt   ~c)g :
It is clear that nz() > 0 for 0  zt  ~c , but nz() R 0 for zt > ~c . If  = 0, it is
true that nz() > 0. If  = 1, the reverse is true. In the ideal case with  2 (0; 1),
the second term, 
t(zt   ~c), is a monotonically increasing function of zt. Thus
there exists a unique ~zt  ~z(pt; gt+1) such that nz(zt = ~zt) = 0. Given (11), (6) and
hg(gt+1) < 0, the implicit function theorem suggests that ~zg() < 0 and ~zp() > 0.
The intuitions of the results in Proposition 1 are the following. Dene rst the
relative price of child quantity to that of the leisure good, rt, as rt  zt(q+eet+1)pt : an
increase in both zt and et+1 but a decrease in pt cause an increase in rt. For gt+1  g^,
16
the relative price is rt  qztpt . The results in part (a) can be explained on the basis
of the substitutability between children and the leisure good: the lower the price of
the leisure good, the lower (higher) the demand for children (the leisure good). Since
child quality (et+1) does not depend on pt, child quantity decreases but the leisure
good increases directly due to an increase in rt.
An increase in gt+1 has three negative e¤ects on nt. GWs quality-quantity tradeo¤
is one of them which makes nt more expensive relative to et+1 for gt+1 > g^. In
general, even a small initial increase in et+1 due to an increase in gt+1 can lead to a
large decrease (increase) in nt (et+1) if the interaction between quality and quantity
is strong - i.e., close substitutes (e.g., Becker and Lewis, 1973). The second negative
e¤ect makes child quantity more expensive relative to the leisure good by increasing
rt for gt+1 > g^. In that sense, the current setup strengthens the usual interaction
between et+1 and nt. If there are no substitutes for children - i.e.,  converges to
zero, this e¤ect will diminish to zero. The last e¤ect of gt+1 on nt arises through a
decrease in ht+1. As parents derive utility from the level of human capital of each
child, a decrease in ht+1 decreases the marginal utility of child quantity according to
(8) for  2 (0; 1). Again, if there are no substitutes for children ( = 0), this e¤ect
will vanish. The increase in gt+1, on the other hand, has an ambiguous e¤ect on dt. A
positive e¤ect works through an increase in rt and a decrease in ht+1 while a negative
e¤ect works through a decrease in nt.13
An increase in zt has opposite e¤ects on nt: the income (positive) and substitution
(negative) e¤ects. In a simple model with ~c = 0 and  = 0, these e¤ects are exactly
o¤set, leaving nt unchanged. Introducing ~c > 0 strengthens the income e¤ect hence
nt increases. The strength of this additional income e¤ect, however, becomes weaker
13For the functional forms used by Lagerlof (2006), we nd that the positive e¤ect dominates and
the amount of the leisure good increases with gt+1.
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as zt increases. In the current setup with  > 0, the substitution e¤ect is also stronger
than usual due to rt > 0. At ~zt, the sum of both the usual and additional income
e¤ects is exactly o¤set by the stronger substitution e¤ect. The case with zt < ~zt
implies that the positive e¤ects dominate the substitution e¤ect hence the number
of children increases with zt. In other words, children are relatively cheaper than
the leisure good in this region. In the case with zt < ~zt, however, children are more
expensive than the leisure good (or the substitution e¤ect dominates the income
e¤ect) hence child quantity decreases with zt. Alternatively, the model generates a
hump-shaped relation between nt and zt for given pt and gt+1. A decrease in pt and an
increase in gt+1 make the transition from nz() > 0 to nz() < 0 easier by decreasing
~zt. The optimal amount of the leisure good increases with zt for two reasons. Firstly,
the leisure good is a normal good. Secondly, it is a substitute for children whose price
increases with zt, leading to an increase in rt.
2.4 Technological Progress
The rate of technological progress that occurs between time t and time t + 1 in the
sector producing the consumption good, gt+1, is the same as that in GW, that is, an
implicit function of education at time t, et, and the size of working age population at
time t, Lt:
gt+1  At+1   At
At
= g(et; Lt) (14)
where for Lt  0 and et  0, g(0; Lt) > 0, gi() > 0; and gii() < 0, i = et; Lt.
The rate of technological progress is an increasing concave function of each determi-
nant for a su¢ ciently large population size. Moreover, there is positive technological
progress even if education is zero.14 GW assume gL(0; Lt) = 0 for a su¢ ciently small
14Lagerlof (2006) considers the explicit form for g(et; Lt), that is, gt+1 = (et + )min fLt; ag
where  > 0 measures the "scale" e¤ect of Lt while a > 0 corresponds to limL!1 g() = a for
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population size to ensure that early stages of development take place in a Malthusian
steady state. This assumption is kept in our analysis.
The rate of technological change in the production of the leisure good, gBt+1, is
assumed to follow an exogenous process,
gBt+1 
Bt+1  Bt
Bt
 0; (15)
so as to simplify the analysis. In the following analysis, the dynamical system of the
economy is initially studied under the assumption that gBt+1 = 0 - i.e., the level of
technology in this sector hence the price of the leisure good is constant. We will,
however, analyze the e¤ect of gBt+1 > 0 on the evolution of the dynamical system.
2.5 Population, Technology and E¤ective Resources
The evolution of the size of working population, Lt, technology, At, and e¤ective
resources per worker, xt, is the same as those in GW and is governed by the following
three di¤erence equations:
Lt+1 = ntLt; (16)
At+1 = (1 + gt+1)At; (17)
xt+1 =
1 + gt+1
nt
xt (18)
where their initial levels are historically given at L0, A0 and x0 = (A0X)=L0 respec-
tively. The number of children per person, nt, and the rate of technological progress,
gt+1, are determined by the expressions in (12) and (14) respectively.
Using (15), the evolution of the relative price of the leisure good, pt = 1=Bt, can
given et. Thus population increases technological progress linearly for Lt  a= and then has no
e¤ect.
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be written as
pt+1 =
1
1 + gBt+1
pt (19)
where p0 is historically given. gBt+1 > 0 implies that the leisure good becomes more
a¤ordable over time.
3 The Dynamical System
This section analyzes the dynamical system of the economy which determines its
development through the evolution of population, income per capita, technology levels
in the production of both the consumption and leisure goods, education per worker,
human capital per worker and e¤ective resources per worker. The sequence that
determines the development of the economy in GW, fet; gt; xt; Ltg1t=0, is now extended
to fet; gt; xt; Lt; ptg1t=0 in the current analysis that satises (14)-(19).
Since we do not follow GW in solving for the households optimization problem,
the dynamical system is characterized by one regime rather than two.15 For a given
size of population L, and a given price of the leisure good p, the development of
the economy is determined by the following three-dimensional nonlinear system of
15The utility maximization problem in GW is rather unconventional in the sense that they do not
equate the marginal benet and cost of children when choosing the optimal number of children. If
they did, the decision rule for nt would be nt =
(1 ~c=zt)
q+eet+1
according to which nt is an increasing
concave function of zt and converges to

q+eet+1
smoothly as zt converges to innity for given
et+1. This rule can be derived as a special case of the one in the current model by setting either
 = 1 or pt = 1 in (12) as 
t = 0. The decision rule in GW is more or less an approximation to
this rule in the sense that the same convergence is not smooth and takes place immediately when
zt = ~z. However, this particular approximation simplies the dynamical system in GW greatly as
the system is divided into two regions by ~z. Otherwise, the entire space (xt; et), in which the system
is analyzed, would be the Malthusian region where zt has always a positive e¤ect on nt as there
is no ~z. As can be seen from Proposition 1, the current model generates ~zt without following the
optimization in GW.
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di¤erence equations: 8>>>><>>>>:
et+1 = e(g(et);L)
gt+1 = g(et;L)
xt+1 = (et; gt; xt;L; p)xt
(20)
where (et; gt; xt;L; p)  (1 + gt+1)=nt and the initial values e0, g0 and x0 are histor-
ically given.
The evolution of et and gt is independent of the xt. Therefore, the analysis of
the joint dynamics of education and technology is exactly the same as those in GW.
Broadly speaking, this dynamical subsystem is characterized by three di¤erent con-
gurations in the (et; gt) space, depending on the size of population. For a small pop-
ulation size, there is a unique globally stable steady-state equilibrium (e; g) = (0; gl)
characterizing the dynamical subsystem (see Figure 3 in GW). For a moderate popu-
lation size, the dynamical subsystem is characterized by multiple steady-state equilib-
ria: (e; g) = (eu; gu) is unstable and lies between (e; g) = (0; gl) and (e; g) = (eh; gh)
which are stable. This is depicted in Figure 4 in GW. Figure 5 in GW shows the
dynamical subsystem for a large population size which is characterized by a globally
stable steady-state equilibrium (e; g) = (eh; gh).
3.1 Global Dynamics
We analyze the evolution of the dynamical system of the economy in (20) using a
series of phase diagrams in the (et; xt) space, as described in GW. Each phase diagram,
shown in Figures 2-4, has three components: the Malthusian Frontier which separates
one regime where parental potential income has a positive e¤ect on the chosen number
of children from the other where the e¤ect is negative, the XX locus along which
the e¤ective resources per worker is constant and the EE locus along which the level
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of education per worker is constant. There is one similarity and two di¤erences in
the phase diagrams between ours and GWs. They are the same in terms of the EE
locus. The rst di¤erence lies on the Malthusian Frontier which in GW separates
the one regime where the correlation between parental income and child quantity is
positive from the other where the correlation is zero. The second di¤erence is on the
shape of the XX locus as the current model is more general.
The Conditional Malthusian Frontier According to Proposition 1, the economy
switches the regime from the one where individualsincome has a positive e¤ect on
their chosen number of children to the other where the e¤ect becomes negative when
potential income zt exceeds the time varying critical level ~zt.
For the dynamical system in (20), the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, MMjgt,
is the set of all pairs (et; xt) conditional on given gt, and zt = ~zt  ~z(gt+1; p). More
formally, MMjgt is written as
MMjgt 

(et; xt) : x
1 
t h(et; gt)
 = ~z(g(et)) j gt
	
:
Lemma 1 If (et; xt) 2MMjgt, xt is a monotonically decreasing function of et. More-
over, a decrease in xt along MMjgt is larger than that in the case where ~zt is constant
for an equal increase in et. Furthermore, the critical ~zt decreases along MMjgt as et
increases.
Proof. Given the result in part (c) of Proposition 1 that ~zt is a decreasing function
of gt+1, an increase in et has a negative e¤ect on ~zt through an increase in gt+1. Since
ht is an increasing function of et, xt must decrease in response to an increase in et
along MMjgt.
The Conditional Malthusian Frontier is similar to that in GW in the sense that it
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is a downward sloping curve, intersects the xt axis and asymptotically approaches to
the et axis as xt approaches to zero. As the functional forms are implicit, however, we
cannot predict the second order property of the frontier while it is a strictly convex
function in GW. Without loss of generality, the Conditional Malthusian Frontier
MMjgt is depicted as a downward sloping convex curve in Figures 2-4.
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The frontier is a¤ected by the evolution of population, L, and the price of the
leisure good, p.
Lemma 2 (a) An increase in L and a decrease in p lead MMjgt to shift downward
and leftward.
Proof. According to (14), an increase in L leads to an increase in gt+1. Given the
result in part (c) of Proposition 1, both an increase gt+1 and a decrease in p have a
negative e¤ect on ~zt so that xt must decrease for given et.
By setting pt = 1 and following GWs utility maximization approach, we can
derive their frontier as 
t = 0 in (12). The intuition of the results in Lemma 2 is that
the boundary of the Malthusian region where potential income has a positive e¤ect
on child quantity will shrink as the leisure good becomes cheaper and population size
increases.
TheXX Locus According to (18), the e¤ective resources per worker, xt, is constant
if growth rates of working population and technology are equal. The conditional XX
locus is the set of all pairs (et; xt) for given gt, such that xt is in a steady state. More
formally,
XXjgt  f(et; xt) : xt+1 = xt j gtg :
16The second order property of the Conditional Malthusian Frontier would not a¤ect the qualita-
tive analysis.
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Lemma 3 There exists a unique value 0 < e^ < eh such that (a) for each 0  et < e^,
there are two values for xt 2 XXjgt: xht > xlt such that z(et; xht ) > ~zt and z(et; xlt) < ~zt;
and a unique value xlt < ~xt < x
h
t such that z(et; ~xt) = ~zt; (b) for et = e^, there is a
unique x^ 2 XXjgt such that z(e^; x^) = ~zt; and (c) for e^ < et  eh, there is no
xt 2 XXjgt. Moreover, for zt  ~zt,
xt+1 xt
8>>>><>>>>:
> 0 if [(et; xt) > (et; x
h
t (et)) and 0  et < e^], [(e^; xt) > (e^; x^)] or [et > e^]
= 0 if [(et; xt) = (et; x
h
t (et)) and 0  et < e^] or [(et; xt) = (e^; x^)]
< 0 if (et; xt) < (et; x
h
t ) and 0  et < e^:
For zt  ~zt,
xt+1 xt
8>>>><>>>>:
< 0 if (et; xt) > (et; x
l
t(et)) and 0  et < e^
= 0 if [(et; xt) = (et; x
l
t(et)) and 0  et < e^] or [(et; xt) = (e^; x^)]
> 0 if [(et; xt) < (et; x
l
t(et)) and 0  et < e^]; [(e^; xt) < (e^; x^)] or [et > e^]:
Proof. Rewrite (12) as follows:
nt =
 (1  ~c=zt)
( q +  eet+1)

1 + 	tz

1 
t
  n(et; xt) (21)
where 
t = 	tz

1 
t , 	t = M

q+eet+1
ht+1p
 
1 
, et+1 = e(gt+1), ht+1 = h(gt+1), gt+1 =
g(et;L) and zt = x1 t h(et; gt)
. We nd that nx(et; xt) = ~c(1  )  F (xt; et) where
F (xt; et) = 	tz

1 
t (zt   ~c) which is monotonically increasing in xt for each et - i.e.,
Fx(xt; et) > 0:
17 Since ~c(1 ) is independent of xt, there exists a unique ~xt for given
et, such that ~c(1   ) = F (xt; et) and ~zt = ~x1 t h(et; gt) - i.e., the pair (~xt; et) is
on MMjgt. Both ~c(1   ) and F (xt; et) are depicted in panel (a) of Figure 1 where
17This is essentially the same expression found to prove the result in part (c) of Proposition 1.
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x(et) = (~c=(h

t ))
1=(1 ) such that zt = ~c.18 For xt < ~xt, ~c(1  ) > F (xt; et) hence
nx(xt; et) > 0. For xt > ~xt, ~c(1   ) < F (xt; et) hence nx(xt; et) < 0. Thus there
is a hump-shaped relationship between nt and xt for each et. Hence we can obtain
~nt = n(~xt; et) such that nx(~xt; et) = 0. Now depict both 1 + g(et) and n(xt; et) in the
(nt; xt) space which is given in panel (b) of Figure 1 where x(et) can be determined
from (12) such that nt = n. Since 1+g(et) is independent of xt, it is a horizontal line.
The intersection of 1 + g(et) and n(xt; et) yields two steady-state values, xl(et) and
xh(et), such that xl(et) < ~x(et) < xh(et) if ~nt > 1+ g(et). Furthermore, xt+1  xt > 0
for both xt < xl(et) and xt > xh(et) as nt < 1 + g(et) < ~nt. However, xt+1   xt < 0
for xl(et) < xt < xh(et) as 1 + g(et) < nt  ~nt.
Figure 1. Derivation of the XX locus
Let us now analyze the situation where et increases. For each xt, F (xt; et) increases
as both zt and 	t increase. For the new et and 	t, a decrease in ~xt must be su¢ cient
to restore ~c(1 ) = 	t~z

1 
t (~zt  ~c). In particular, the new ~xt must be smaller than
18The second order property of F (xt; et) is ambiguous depending the values of  and . However,
the qualitative analysis is not a¤ected by this. Hence without loss of generality, F (xt; et) is depicted
as a straight line in Figure 1.
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the old level such that the new ~zt is smaller than the old level. Thus ~nt is smaller
than its old level. It implies that the point, (~nt; ~xt); shifts leftward and downward
in the (nt; xt) space. In other words, ~nt decreases as et increases. Since 1 + g(et)
increases as et increases, there exists a unique e^ such that ~nt = 1 + g(e^). Thus ~xt for
~nt = 1+g(e^) is x^ and the pair (e^; x^) is onMMjgt. Since ~nt < 1+g(et) for e^ < et  eh,
there is no xt 2 XXjgt.
The locus XXjgt is strictly below the curve MMjgt for et < e^ and xt < x^, but
strictly above the curve MMjgt for et < e^ and xt > x^. At (e^; x^), the curve MMjgt
and the locus XXjgt coincide. Since the curve n(xt; et) shifts leftward and downward
as et increases, xlt may either increase or decrease as in GW while x
h
t decreases un-
ambiguously. Hence without loss of generality, the part of the locus XXjgt below the
curve MMjgt is depicted in Figures 2-4 as an upward sloping curve as in GW.
The locus XXjgt is also a¤ected by the evolution of population and the price of
the leisure good.
Lemma 4 An increase in L and a decrease in p lead XXjgt under MMjgt to shift up,
but above MMjgt to shift down. Furthermore, the critical e^ decreases as L increases
and p decreases.
Proof. An increase in L leads to () = (1 + gt+1)=nt > 1 through its direct positive
e¤ect on gt+1 and an indirect negative e¤ect on nt which works through an increase
in et+1, a decrease ht+1 and hence an increase in 	t. Thus nt must increase to restore
the steady-state condition for xt, () = 1. It must be achieved as xlt increases (i.e.,
zt increases) and xht decreases (i.e., zt decreases) for each et. The increase in 	t leads
to a decrease in the corresponding ~xt by shifting F (xt; et) leftward which is consistent
with the result in Lemma 2. For given et, a decrease in ~xt leads to a decrease in ~zt so
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that ~nt decreases. Thus e^ decreases. A decrease in p has the same e¤ect which works
through a decrease in nt for ().
The intuition of the result in Lemma 4 is that the economy may cross over the
Malthusian Frontier for a given level of education.19 The locus XXjgt in GW can be
derived when pt =1 as the part of the locus above the Malthusian Frontier becomes
vertical at e^ if one follows GWs utility maximization.20 In that case, the locus XXjgt
shifts up when the size of population increases as 	t = 0.
The EE locus The conditional EE locus is exactly the same as that in GW, that
is a set all pairs (et; xt) conditional on given gt such that education per worker et is
in a steady state:
EEjgt  f(et; xt) : et+1 = et j gtg :
GW shows that the steady-state values of et are independent of gt and xt, for a given
size of population. Therefore the locus EE is a vertical line in the (et; xt) space and
shifts rightward as population size increases. The location of the locus EE identies
one of three phases of economic development in terms of the evolution of education
and technology. In the early stage of development, the locus EE is vertical at e = 0
representing the globally stable temporary steady-state equilibrium, (e; g) = (0; gl)
and
et+1   et
8><>: = 0 if et = 0< 0 if et > 0: (22)
19As far as the consequence of an increase in the population size is concerned, this result is not
consistent with the underlying assumption of the model that education per person increases with
the rate of technological progress which is an increasing function of the population size. However it
is a theoretical possibility which can also be predicted by GW.
20Under such circumstances, one must maintain the assumption (A4) in GW to ensure that the
XX locus is nonempty for zt  ~z, that is, g^ < (= q)  1 < g(eh(L0); L0):
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In the intermediate stage of development, characterized by the multiple locally stable
temporary steady-state equilibria, (0; gl), (eu; gu) and (eh; gh), the locus EE is vertical
at et = 0, et = eu and et = eh. The locus EE at et = eu and et = eh shift rightward
as population size increases. The global dynamics of et are given by
et+1   et
8>>>><>>>>:
= 0 if et 2

0; eu; eh
	
> 0 if eu < et < e
h
< 0 if 0 < et < e
u or et > eh:
(23)
In the advanced stage of development, the locus EE at et = eh represents a glob-
ally stable steady-state equilibrium, (eh; gh). It shifts rightward as population size
increases. The global dynamics of et in this case is given by
et+1   et
8>>>><>>>>:
= 0 if et = e
h
> 0 if 0  et < eh
< 0 if et > e
h:
(24)
3.2 Conditional Steady-State Equilibria
The dynamical system in the early stage of economic development with small popu-
lation sizes is characterized by two conditional steady-state equilibria which are given
by the intersection between the XX locus and the EE locus in the (et; xt) space,
as shown in Figure 2. Both equilibria are conditional on the rate of technological
progress, the size of population and the price of the leisure good. Since the conditional
steady-state equilibrium (e; x) = (0; xh) is unstable, the locally stable conditional
steady-state equilibrium (e; x) = (0; xl) is the Malthusian steady-state. Another rea-
son why the unstable steady-state equilibrium is not the Malthusian steady-state is
that an increase in potential income has a negative e¤ect on child quantity which is
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opposite to the assumption on which the Malthusian model is built.
Figure 2. The Conditional Dynamical System in the Early Stage
The dynamical system in the intermediate stage of development with moderate pop-
ulation sizes, depicted in Figure 3, is similar to that in GW in the sense that the
Malthusian conditional steady-state is locally stable and the conditional steady-state
equilibrium (eu; xl(eu)) is a saddlepoint. In addition to those in GW, there are two
conditional unstable steady-state equilibria: (0; xh(0)) and (eu; xh(eu)). If the level of
education is above eu, the dynamical system converges to an equilibrium with a level
of education eh and possibly a steady-state growth rate of xt, given the population
size and the price of the leisure good. In the advanced stage of development with
large population sizes, the dynamical system is, as depicted in Figure 4, converges
globally to an education level eh and possibly a steady-state growth rate of xt, given
the population size and the price of the leisure good.
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Figure 3. The Conditional Dynamical System in the Intermediate Stage
3.3 Analysis
Collecting the results obtained so far, we can now discuss the process of economic de-
velopment from a Malthusian regime to a Modern Growth regime and a demographic
transition through a Post-Malthusian regime. Consider that the economy is in the
early stage of development where population size is su¢ ciently small, the rate of tech-
nological progress is so slow that parents nd it ine¢ cient to invest in their childrens
education. In addition, the price of the leisure good is extremely high as the technol-
ogy of producing these goods is so primitive that its consumption/production is small
and children are very cheap relative to the leisure good. In Figure 2, the situation is
represented by the temporary, conditional and locally stable Malthusian steady-state
equilibrium where both the level of education and e¤ective resources per worker are
constant, for a given rate of technological change. Consequently, output per capita is
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constant from (1) and (11). Thus population is growing slowly, at the same rate as
technological progress. For an extremely high price of the leisure good, the unstable
conditional steady-state equilibrium, (0; xh), may not exist so that the Malthusian
steady-state equilibrium can be globally stable as theXX locus for zt > ~zt (i.e., above
the Malthusian Frontier) may become vertical at e^ as in GW. Temporary shocks to
technology and population will be adjusted towards the Malthusian steady-state.
Figure 4. The Conditional Dynamical System in the Advanced Stage
Over time, the price of the leisure good may decrease and create the unstable con-
ditional steady-state equilibrium (i.e., the XX locus for zt > ~zt is no longer vertical
at e^). If the e¤ective resources per worker jump above the XX locus for zt > ~zt due
to temporary shocks to population and technology, the system will converge to zero
education level and possibly a steady-state growth rate of xt, given the population
size, the rate of technological progress and the price of the leisure good. Under such
circumstances, the number of children per person will decrease until the minimum
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quantity of children constraint binds as children are expensive relative to the leisure
good in this region. In other words, it will generate a demographic transition. How-
ever, we do not consider this possibility. Instead, we assume that the economy stays
around the Malthusian steady-state at this early stage of development.
When the size of the population reaches a su¢ ciently high level, the dynamical
system will be characterized by multiple steady-state equilibria as in GW: the Malthu-
sian steady-state with constant income per capita, slow technological progress and
zero education, and the Modern Growth steady-state with fast technological progress,
a high level of education and increasing income per capita. As depicted in Figure 3,
the convergence towards these steady states is history dependent. In addition, the
economy may jump over the boundary and evolve accordingly due to shocks to tech-
nology and education. Like GW, however, we are interested in the economy starting
out in the Malthusian steady-state so that it stays there at this intermediate stage.
Figure 5 in GW shows that the evolution of education and technology is monotonic
and converges to a unique globally stable steady-state with fast technological progress
and a high level of education when the size of population reaches a su¢ ciently high
level. Simultaneously, the Malthusian steady-state disappears. Exactly the same
mechanism is at work in the current analysis. As in GW, technological progress has
opposite e¤ects on the evolution of population growth in the Malthusian region of
Figure 4. As shown in Proposition 1, technological progress has a negative e¤ect on
the number of children per adult through an increase in education per child and an
overall decrease in human capital per child, for a given level of potential income and
a given price of the leisure good. At the same time, it increases parental potential
income which has a positive e¤ect on the number of children per person. If the price
of the leisure good is decreasing, child quantity will tend to decrease. Initially, the
positive e¤ect dominates all the negative e¤ects hence the rate of population growth
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will increase, reecting the characteristics of the Post-Malthusian regime.
If the positive e¤ect of technological change continues to dominate the negative
e¤ects on the number of children per person, the rate of population growth will
increase continuously until the economy crosses over the Malthusian Frontier. As
soon as the economy enters the Modern Growth region, the rate of population growth
will decrease unambiguously as the growth in parental potential income produces a
negative e¤ect on the number of children per person. Income per capita continues
to increase while the rate of population growth continues to decrease even without
any further improvements in technology (i.e., both education per person and human
capital per person are constant). The source of growth for income per capita will
be the growth of e¤ective resources per capita as the rate of technological change is
faster than population growth in this region. This is the main di¤erence between the
current analysis and that in GW. Under the same circumstances, GW would predict
a constant growth rate of population but growing income per capita as parental
potential income has no e¤ect on fertility. In fact, only faster technological change
will lead to a decrease in population growth by raising education. In the current
model, however, rapid changes in technology will produce an even faster decrease
in population growth than that in GW as it will be decreasing already due to the
negative e¤ect of growing income per capita.
If the price of the leisure good decreases, it will be easier for the economy to move
into the Modern Growth region as the Malthusian Frontier shifts down and the critical
level of education decreases. Suppose that the highest level of education falls below
its critical level and stays unchanged - i.e., et = eh < e^. If it was GWs economy, it
would stay in the globally stable steady-state characterized by the intersection of the
XX and EE locuses. In the current model, however, a continuous decrease in the
price of the leisure good reduces the critical level of education below the existing level
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of education. Consequently, the economy moves into the Modern Growth regime. In
other words, it will require a lower level of education hence a lower rate of technological
progress for the economy to experience the characteristics of the Modern Growth
regime as children are more expensive relative to the leisure good. In that sense, the
current model o¤ers an alternative mechanism for the transition out of the Malthusian
stagnation.
The decrease in population growth is bounded from below as the minimum quan-
tity of children constraint binds. If the minimum quantity of children is one per adult,
population growth will be zero in the Modern Growth regime. Under such circum-
stances, the economy converges to a global steady state in which both education and
the rate of technological progress are constant as population size is constant. If the
minimum number of children above (below) one, the size of population will increase
(decrease) and hence the evolution of education and technology will move accordingly.
4 Conclusion
The paper has extended the unied growth model of GW by generalizing their utility
function in which consumption and children are independent of each other, with one
in which some commodities independent of children while the others are substitutes
for children. We consider some leisure goods as substitutes for children. The model
is then used to account for the historical evolution of population, technology and
output over the course of economic development of Western European countries. The
performance of the model is the same as that of GW in the Malthusian and Post-
Malthusian regimes. In GW, an increase in education generates the demographic
transition from high to low fertility through which the economy enters the Modern
Growth regime. In the current model, however, the demographic transition happens
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naturally when children becomes relatively more expensive than their substitutes, for
a given level of education and a given price of leisure goods. A decrease in the price
of leisure goods and an increase in education reinforce the underlying mechanism.
The model is theoretical and the results are qualitative. In the future work, we
will examine the model quantitatively as Lagerlof (2006) does GWs model.
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